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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/
Respondent,
vs.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ROBERT EUGENE JONES,

Supreme Court No.

Defendant/
Appellant.

880298

Priority No. 1

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal is
conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann,
§78-2-2(3) (i) (1988) and Utah Code Ann. §77-35-26 (2) (a) (1987).
This appeal is from a conviction of Murder in the First Degree, a
Capital Offense, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202; and
Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree Felony, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §76-6-203; and Attempted Murder, a Second Degree Felony, a
Lesser Included Offense of the charge of Attempted Murder in the
Second Degree, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 and §76-4-102
(2) in the Second Judicial District Court, County of Weber, State
of Utah, the Honorable David E. Roth presiding.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
1.

COUNSEL GINGER FLETCHER DID NOT BRING TO LIGHT
-4-

IN ANY MANNER DEFENDANT'S MENTAL
ILLNESS/DISORDERS, EVEN THOUGH AMPLE EVIDENCE
WAS AVAILABLE REGARDING A LONG HISTORY OF
MENTAL ILLNESS SUFFERED BY DEFENDANT.
2.

COUNSEL DID NOT PURSUE THE OBVIOUS THEME OF THE
CASE, EVEN AFTER HAVING AGREED TO DO SO.

3.

COUNSEL FAILED TO CONSULT WITH DEFENDANT ON KEY
ISSUES, AND MISLED DEFENDANT.

4.

COUNSEL MISLED DEFENDANT BY HAVING 23 WITNESSES
SUBPOENAED, BUT CALLING ONLY THREE TO TESTIFY.

5.

COUNSEL FAILED TO ADEQUATELY CROSS-EXAMINE
CERTAIN KEY WITNESSES.

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Statutes
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202, Murder in the First Degree:
"(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first
degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes
the death of another under any of the following
circumstances:
"(c) The actor knowingly created a great risk of death
to a person other than the victim and the actor.
"(d) The homicide was committed while the actor was
engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit or
flight after committing or attempting to
commit...aggravated burglary, burglary. . ."
"(2)

Murder in the First Degree is a capital offense."

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203, Aggravated Burglary:
"A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in
attempting, committing, or fleeing from a burglary the
actor or another participant in the crime: (a) causes
bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in
the crime; (b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a
dangerous or deadly weapon against any person who is
not a participant in the crime; or (c) is armed with a
deadly weapon or possesses or attempts to use any
explosive or deadly weapon."
-5-

"(2)

Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony."

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202, Burglary:
"(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or
remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a
building with intent to commit a felony or theft or
commit an assault on any person.
"(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless
it was committed in a dwelling, which event it is a
felony of the second degree.
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203, Murder in the Second Degree:
"(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the
second degree if the actor: (a) intentionally or
knowingly causes the death of another; (b) intending to
cause serious bodily injury to another, he commits an
act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the
death of another; (c) acting under circumstances
evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, he
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death
to another and thereby causes the death of another; or
(d) while in the commission, attempted commission, or
immediately flight from the commission or attempted
commission.. .aggravated burglary, burglary...causes the
death of another person other than the party as defined
in §76-2-202.
"(2) Murder in the Second Degree is a Felony of the
First Degree."
Utah Code Ann. §76-4-102, Attempt - Classification of Offenses:
"Criminal attempt to commit: ...(2) a felony in the
first degree is a felony of the second degree..."
Rules
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.4, Utah Code of Judicial
Administration (1988), Communication:
"(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information.
"(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to tfre extent
reasonably necessary to enable the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation."

-6-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant/ ROBERT EUGENE JONES/ was charged on or about
March 14/ 1983/ by Information with Murder in the First Degree, a
Capital Offense; Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree Felony; and
Attempted Murder in the First Degree, a First Degree Felony (R.
1/ 2/ 3 ) . Defendant was convicted as charged in a trial by jury
held August 29/ 1983/ through September 7, 1983/ in the Second
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, presiding
(R. 68-83).

On September 15/ 1983/ Judge Hyde sentenced

Defendant to the Utah State Prison for terms as follows:

Life on

the charge of Murder in the First Degree, a Capital Offense; Not
Less than Five Years and May Be for Life on the charge of
Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree Felony; and Not Less than
Five Years and May Be for Life on the charge of Attempted
Criminal Homicide, First Degree Felony (R. 149-151, 155). The
sentences were run concurrent (R. 170). A Notice of Appeal was
filed on October 13, 1983 (R. 166).
Defendant's case was reversed on appeal by the Utah
Supreme Court February 26, 1987, and remanded for a new trial (R.
1851) (see Utah Supreme Court's decision [Addendum, Exhibit 13]).
Attorney Ginger Fletcher entered as counsel for Defendant on
April 28, 1987 (R. I860).

Defendant was convicted in a second

trial by jury held June 22-30, 1987, in the Second Judicial
District court, the Honorable David E. Roth presiding
1916, 2095, 2099, 2105) .

(R. 1906-

When Defendant was convicted the second

time, he was convicted of the following offenses:
-7-

Murder in the

First Degree (R. 2099); Aggravated Burglary (2105); and of lesser
included offense of Attempted Second Degree Murder, a Second
Degree Felony (R. 2095) .
On July 13/ 1987/ Defendant's attorney/ Ginger
Fletcher, moved to withdraw as Defendant's counsel due to an
apparent conflict with the Defendant/ which Motion was granted
(R. 2108/ 2862-2863).

Attorney Robert L. Froerer, an attorney

with the Weber County Public Defenders Association/ entered as
defense counsel July 20 f 1987 (R. 2109).

On September 2 # 1987f

Judge Roth sentenced the Defendant to the Utah State Prison for
terms as follows:

Life in Prison on the charge of Murder in the

First Degree/ a Capital Offense; Not Less than Five Years and May
Be for Life on the charge of Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree
Felony (R. 2181); and Not Less then One nor More Than 15 Years on
the charge of Attempted Second Degree Murder, a Second Degree
Felony (R. 2183) .

All sentencing terms were run concurrent (R.

2129/ 2130) .
Defendant filed/ pro s e , a Motion for New Trial on the
morning of September 9,

1987 (R. 2148)/ while on the same day in

the afternoon Defendant's attorney, without knowledge of the
prior filing by Defendant/ filed a Notice of Appeal (R, 2180/
2185).

That appeal was subsequently voluntarily dismissed on

defense counsel's motion on January 12/ 1988 (R. 2804).
After some delay in Defendant's actions attempting to
appoint new counsel (R. 2805/ et. seq.f 2836/ 2839)/ a hearing on
Defendant's Motion for New Trial was held on July 19/ 1988 (R.
-8-

2845) , which Motion was denied by Judge Roth (R. 2848) .

A Notice

of Appeal was filed August 5, 1988 (R. 2851) .

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 11, 1983, Kim Chapman was shot and killed in
the basement of his father's house.

Concurrently, Beverly Jones,

who was living with him at the time, was seriousLy wounded.
Defendant Robert Jones was present in the Chapman house at the
time of the shooting and was charged with Homicide, Attempted
Homicide, and Aggravated Burglary.
The legal issues raised in this appeal are related to a
complex set of facts which were discovered subsequent to Mr.
Jones 0 first trial.
In order to portray the facts which are pertinent to
Defendant's true defense, Appellant will chronologically address
the facts as they occurred in separate subsections of this
Statement of Facts section of the brief.

SUMMARY OF PERTINENT TRIAL TESTIMONY FROM DEFENDANT'S
FIRST TRIAL
The Defendant's first trial on these charges lasted
some six days, as is evidenced by some 1,700 pages of transcript.
The State contended that Defendant planned and calculated the
death of Chapman and attempted to kill Beverly during the
confrontation.

The State contended that Defendant was a

completely rational person, who only used previous suicide
attempts and unusual behavior as a means of escaping punishment
-9-

when he had been acting contrary to accepted social behavior.
The State did not call psychiatric or medical witnesses as to the
mental capacity of the Defendant to form the required intent
necessary for the conviction of these crimes, although the issue
of Defendant's mental condition was raised during trial and
argument.
The defense argued that Defendant had been tormented by
Beverly in her on-again, off-again behavior, and that because of
his previous mental problems, he was especially susceptible to
emotional trauma.

Defense counsel argued that Defendant did not

intend on harming either Chapman or Beverly, but that the
shooting occurred only because Chapman polled a gun on Defendant
as he was leaving the apartment.

The defense contended that a

struggle for the gun between Chapman and the Defendant

resulted

in the fatal wound to Chapman, and that Beverly Jones was hit by
ricocheting bullets during the fight.

The defense did not call

psychiatric or medical witnesses as to the mental condition of
the Defendant during this period of time, but argued he was under
extreme emotional distress at the time of the shooting.
The first trial included much testimony about the
relationship between the Defendant and Beverly Jones regarding
their on-again, off-again intimate relationship.

In April 1981,

she moved in with Defendant (R. 852). They separated in October
1982 (R. 877 and 881).

On February 17, 1983, Beverly Jones moved

into the basement of the Earl Chapman home.

Earl Chapman, the

father of Kim Chapman, lived in the main portion of the house
-10-

with his wife.

Beverly would stay in the Chapman house at night

and return to her home in the day (T. 942-945).
Beverly invited Defendant to come over to the Chapman
apartment and visit her.

She informed him that a spare key was

kept under the steps to the Chapman home (R. 1354) .
On the night of the shooting, Defendant had been out
for some time and was cold and wet and wanted to get out of the
weather and wanted desperately to talk with Beverly.

He took the

key which she had told him about from under the steps and opened
the door into the Chapman basement (R. 1382-1384).
Defendant testified that it was about 10:00 p.m. when
he arrived in the basement and that he began sitting there
thinking that it was a "dumb idea" to be there; that he started
walking to the door to leave when he remembered his gloves, which
were lying on the couch.

Just as he was proceeding to retrieve

them, he heard the upstairs door open, and the kids, Beverly, and
Kim Chapman walked through the door upstairs (R. 1387) .
Defendant then hid in a closet waiting for Chapman and
Beverly to go to bed.
(R. 1389).

He explained that he had no gun with him

Chapman and Beverly turned the television on.

The

Defendant opened the door of the closet to leave, but at that
point saw Beverly and Chapman engaged in oral sex (R. 1393-94) .
After hearing nothing for several minutes, he again
attempted to sneak out of the apartment.

Defendant's automatic

alarm went off on his watch, and Chapman turned around and looked
at him (R. 1397).

Chapman reached for a fireplace tool, at which
-11-

point Defendant pulled out a knife from its sheath and put it in
his hand.

Beverly came toward the bathroom and spoke to him

saying, "Bob, what the hell are you doing here?

Are you crazy?"

Defendant told her to shut up and walk over and sit down. He
told Chapman to leave, but Chapman said he wasn°t going to and
that he would stay with Beverly (T. 1399-1400).
Defendant testified that he then confronted Beverly
about a rape incident, and that she admitted to Chapman that it
did not actually happen.
Chapman became really angry and told Beverly to get her
stuff and her kids out of the house the next morning and out of
his life (R. 1406-1410).
Defendant recalled that at this point he wanted to
leave the room and started walking toward the outside entrance
door.

He got over to the door and then felt something shoved in

his back.

Chapman began telling Defendant that he was going to

kill him because he had ruined Chapman's life (R. 1409-1410).
Defendant did not know where Chapman got the gun.
Defendant stated that while he was pleading with Chapman not to
shoot him, Beverly was urging Chapman to kill him (T. 1412).

He

stated that he became worried that Chapman would pull the trigger
and tried to knock the gun away from him (R. 1413).

He stated

that Beverly swung something at him and hit him on the back and
that he kept on ducking to try to move away.

He testified that

the gun went off and exploded as they were fighting . Two more
shots went off, and the next thing he remembered, Beverly was
-12-

sitting on the living room floor leaning on the poker.
was next to Chapman's leg on the floor (R. 1414).

The gun

The next thing

the Defendant remembers, he was running out of the house.
Earl Chapman testified and verified that the key found
on Defendant that night was normally hidden under the steps (R.
613-614) .
A gun was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 20 at the
first trial which was represented to be the one that killed
Chapman and wounded Beverly Jones (R. 793). The gun was a .38
caliber pistol (hereinafter referred to as Exhibit 20).
Witnesses testified that the gun admitted into evidence was
similar to a gun owned by Defendant and to another gun owned by
Beverly Jones (R. 1058, 1133).

Defense counsel objected to the

admission of the gun which was admitted into evidence at the
trial, because the State failed to link it to the Defendant (R.
787 and 793). The gun entered into evidence was neither
Defendant's nor Beverly's gun. Caine was led to believe by the
State that it was Beverly's gun.

Officer Norman Soakai, a

detective for the Ogden City Police Department, testified that he
obtained Exhibit 20 on July 26 from a pawn shop called "The Gift
House" in Ogden.

He stated he was unable to link the Defendant,

Robert Jones, to that gun (R. 825).
The State called James Gaskill, Director of the Weber
State College Crime Lab, as a ballistics expert.

He testified

that, in his opinion, Exhibit 20 was the gun which was used to
shoot both Kim Chapman and Beverly Jones (R. 749).
-13-

Beverly Jones testified that when she first saw Jones
in the basement, he had a black snub-nosed gun in his hand. (R.
834.)•

Beverly stated she did not know what kind of pistol it

was, although it looked like a .38 caliber pistol.

She said it

looked like Exhibit 20 and that Defendant had a couple of guns of
this type.

(R. 873.)

Beverly acknowledged that she had been

given a .38 caliber gun by Defendant and she had taken it on one
occasion elk hunting.

She agreed that she had shown it to a

fellow employee at Mervyn's but did not acknowledge that it was
hers.

(R. 875-876.)

She denied that she ever owned a .38

caliber gun or that she had the gun in the Chapman house in March
of 1983.

(R. 878.)

Beverly Jones testified that

after the elk hunt in September 1982, the gun she had been given
was placed by Defendant Jones in a closet in her house in
approximately November 1982 (R. 879).
Beverly was shown Exhibit 20, but stated that she did
not believe it was the gun she had been given before.

She also

testified that she is not sure whether that was the gun she had
at the elk hunt, because they all looked the same to her.

(R.

970.)
She stated that the night of the shooting , the gun was
pointed at Kim by the Defendant and that when Kim and Defendant
got to the door, Kim grabbed Defendant's wrists.
point that the shots went off.

It was at this

She stated that Jones had not

fired the gun until Kim Chapman grabbed his wrists.
985.)

(R. 984,

Neither shot which hit her made her immobile, and she was
-14-

able to move around in the basement after Defendant left.
990-991.)

(R.

She stated that she did not see any gun on the floor

after Defendant left (R. 989).
Eileen Johnston was called and stated that she was a
neighbor of the Jones family and had seen Beverly Jones wearing a
hand gun on her hip (in approximately September 1982).

She

stated that the size, shape and coloring of the handle of Exhibit
20 looked very similar to the one holstered by Beverly Jones.
(R. 1021-1024.)
Doris Kennedy, the sister of Defendant Bob Jones,
testified that she saw Beverly wearing a .38 caliber gun and
asked her about it, at which time Beverly replied that Bob had
bought it for her.

Exhibit 20, according to Ms. Kennedy, looked

very much like Beverly's gun, because the handle was similar and
it had a unique wood grain.

She further stated that Beverly told

her after she had moved into Chapman's basement in February 1983
that she had a gun with her and would use it if she had to to
protect herself from Bob.

(R. 1059-1062.)

Bobbie Jones, the mother of Defendant, testified that
her son bought Beverly a gun and that Beverly wore it for three
or four days around the neighborhood so she could get used to
carrying it.

She stated that Exhibit 20 looked like the gun that

Bob had bought for her but did not know for sure.

She stated

that when Bob moved back into the family house in November (1982)
(prior to the shooting), Mrs. Jones took Bob's pistol and told
him he could not have it.

She stated that Bob did not have
-15-

access to the gun and that the gun was taken to her daughter
Doris0 house and locked up.

She further stated that she never

saw Beverly's gun after Beverly moved into the Chapman residence.
(R. 1109-1111.)

Mrs. Jones had taken all of the guns out of her

house shortly before Christmas because her son was having
problems and she did not want him to have access to any gun.
1125.)

(R.

She stated that there were two identical .38 caliber

pistols owned by Bob and Beverly.
from him.

As to Bob's gun, she kept it

(R. 1110.)
Robert Jones, Sr ., the father of Defendant, testified

that Exhibit 20 is identical to the two guns o^ned one by Beverly
and the other by his son.

(R. 1152.)

He stated that the .38

caliber was purchased for Beverly because she said she had to
have a gun when she went hunting, because she was frightened of
snakes.

Bob's .38 caliber was taken away from him in December

(1982) prior to the shooting and was kept at Bob's sister's
house.

He did not have access to the gun after that time.

(R.

1154-1155.)
Defendant Robert Jones testified that he purchased a
.38 caliber revolver for elk hunting season and a short time
later bought an identical gun for Beverly.

(R. 1293.)

He stated

that he believed Exhibit 20 was the gun he had purchased for
Beverly.
Defendant testified that while they were living
together, both .38 caliber pistols remained in the household.
(R. 1313.)

Later, when he was evicted by Beverly (November
-16-

1982)/ he removed his own .38 caliber gun and took it to an
apartment he was renting (R. 1350, 1351.)
Defendant testified bhat on two separate occasions, Kim
Chapman confronted him with a gun which looked very much like the
.38 caliber gun he had purchased for Beverly.

(R. 1352.)

Jones testified that he did not have a gun when he
entered the Chapman residence.

It was only upon his attempt to

leave that Kim Chapman shoved a gun in his back.

He stated he

did not know which gun Kim had in his hand, but it could have
been Exhibit 20.

(R.

1389, 1409-1412.)

On cross-examination, Defendant stated he had no idea
where Kim got the gun.

He stated that the last time he saw it,

it was lying by Kim's leg on the floor (R. 1457).
Earl Chapman, Kim Chapman's father, on redirect, stated
that when he went downstairs he did not see a gun or knife
anywhere.

(R. 1501.)

He admitted that he never made a thorough

search for the gun because he was concerned about his son and
Beverly.

(R. 1502.)
In addition to this testimony concerning the guns,

there were also references to the guns made by both attorneys in
closing argument.

Mr. Caine, Defendant's attorney, argued

mistakenly that the gun used in the shooting was Beverly Jones'
gun (because that's what the State had allowed him to believe)
(R. 1673).

Even Prosecutor Hughes agreed that there is no

evidence to connect the gun used in the shooting to the Defendant
(R. 1593).
-17-

SUMMARY OF PERTINENT TESTIMONY FROM
EVIDENTIARY HEARING HELD JANUARY 6, 1986
Prior to submission of briefs during Defendant's first
appeal, the case was remanded to the Second Judicial District
Court for an evidentiary hearing before the Honorable Ronald 0.
Hyde on January 6, 1986.

The following individuals testified:

John Caine and Maurice Richards, Defendant°s attorneys at his
first trial; Donald Hughes, the prosecuting County Attorney;
Norman Soakai, an Ogden police officer investigating the crime;
and Terry Carpenter, a South Ogden police officer associated with
the investigation•
John Caine stated that his detense at trial was that
the murder weapon which was admitted was the gun given by
Defendant to Beverly and was not the twin to that gun kept by Mr,
Jones.

Throughout the trial he stated he believed that the

murder weapon was one of the two weapons purchased by Jones. He
stated that the County Attorney never told him he was mistaken in
that belief.

(R. 1673.)

Exhibit 1, which is Officer Soakai1s police report, was
admitted.

It was typed on August 29, 1983 - the same day the

trial began (Addendum, Exhibit 1, hereafter referred to as
Exhibit 1). Caine stated he was not informed that this report
existed when he began the Jones trial (R. 1675).

The report

states that Norwood Fridal and Reynold Hasbie, who were armed
robbers, had had possession of the gun which ballistics tests
proved was also the murder weapon (R. 1677) .
-18-

Caine also testified that he was never informed by the
police that Fridal and Hastie did not know Robert Jones, and did
not assist him in any way (R. 1677-1678).

Caine further stated

that he was not aware, as Soakai1s report states, that another
individual, Chris Singleton, had identified the gun as the murder
weapon, even before the ballistics test had been performed (R.
1680).

He acknowledged that it would have been important for him

as a defense lawyer to investigate how Chris Singleton might have
known this was the murder weapon (R. 1682-1683).

He said he

would have considered it a significant fact that there was a
witness that somehow knew this was a murder weapon even before
the ballistics test proved such.

Neither Officer Soakai nor the

prosecutor told him there was such a witness (R. 1680).
Caine stated that he knew Officer Soakai had gotten the
gun from the pawn shop but did not know exactly how he got it.
Caine did not cross-examine Soakai in Defendant's first trial,
but stated that he would have considered cross-examining Soakai
about the information contained in Exhibit 1 had he known that
the report existed (R. 1682-1683).

He acknowledged that he knew

of part of Mr. Soakai's investigation but did not know the full
extent of it and was not operating at the time of trial with full
knowledge of all of the facts (R. 1683).

In his opinion, the

testimony concerning the chain of custody of the gun would have
corroborated the story told by the Defendant; i.e., that the gun
was already in someone else's possession when the Defendant
entered the home.

(The defense was attempting to show that
-19-

Beverly Jones had the gun while the State was discounting that
assertion.)

(R. 1684.)

Came also stated that he did not know that a Mr.
Blarney was the original purchaser of the weapon and that a Mr.
McDill is the one who pawned it.

He stated that had he known

this it would have been useful in investigating who was involved
with the gun and checking to see if any of those people had a
connection with Beverly.

There would be an issue as to whether

any of these people knew each other in order to connect the
murder weapon to Beverly.

(R. 1704-1705.)

Caine agreed that if he could have shown' a connection
between Beverly Jones and Chris Singleton, a connection alleged
to exist by Defendant's family, such fact would have been
powerful evidence in support of Defendant's position.

(R. 1717.)

Maurice Richards testified that he spoke with Mr.
Hastie, who denied any possibility that he had been connected
with the shooting (R. 1726).

Richards further stated that

Officer Soakai never revealed to him that his investigation
showed that Fridal and Hastie had had possession of the weapon.
The only thing the police told him was that Chris Singleton had
pawned the gun or had done something with it, which led him to
talk to Hastie (R. 1728).
Richards also agreed that it would have been important
to their case to show that the registered owner of the gun was
someone totally unconnected with Robert Jones (R. 1730).
Donald Hughes, the prosecuting attorney for the State,
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testified that he had no specific recollection of ever having
talked to Officer Soakai about Chris Singleton's statement that
the gun had been used in several armed robberies and was the same
gun that killed Kim Chapman.

He stated that he had no

recollection of Soakai's report at trial (R. 1746-1748).
Contradicting himself, he said that defense counsel had full
information concerning the report, because he had discussed it
with them (R. 1748).

He related that he was aware that the

murder weapon had been traced to William Harvey Blarney and that
he knew the original purchaser was not Robert Jones.

He did not

recall telling the defense lawyers that he had positively
identified the registered owner of the weapon and that it was not
the Defendant (R.

1750-1751.)

Officer Norman Soakai contradicted several of Mr.
Hughes1 statements.

He stated that he had told Don Hughes

everything that was in the report before he prepared it, and that
Don Hughes took notes while he explained his report.

He told

Hughes about talking to Chris Singleton, to Fridal and to Hastie.
(R. 1805).

Two weeks before the trial began, he was told by

Hughes to prepare the report so he could give a copy of it to
Caine and Richards.

The day before the trial, Soakai went down

to get a copy of the report.

He picked up the copy personally on

the day of trial, because Hughes said he needed a copy.
delivered a copy to Hughes at the courtroom (R. 1809).

He
He was

not asked to give the report to the defense attorneys; rather,
Hughes said he would do it himself (R. 1808) .
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Soakai stated that he had been instructed as a
detective not to go out and voluntarily talk to defense lawyers.
He does not ever recall talking to the defense attorneys about
the report.

(R. 1820-1821).

Soakai further testified that he believed the evidence
he obtained as to the chain of custody of the murder weapon was
very, very important.

(R. 1806A.)

He attempted to connect

either Chris Singleton or Hastie or Fridal to Robert Jones on
many occasions/ but was unable to make that connection (R. 1803.)

SUMMARY OF SECOND TRIAL
1.

Testimony Relating to .38 Caliber Weapon

Although the information stated above was available to
Attorney Fletcher, none of it was utilized on behalf of Defendant
in his second trial. The second trial was devoid of any
reference to the weapon used in the Chapman shooting .
Roger Birt testified that in December 1982 he had
purchased a revolver with money given to him by the Defendant and
then gave the gun to the Defendant.

He testified further that

when he and the Defendant took the gun out to fire it, it was
somewhat different, in that the serial number had been filed off
(R. 2484-2488) .
Beverly Jones testified that, while she and Kim Chapman
were watching television, she turned and saw the Defendant
standing in the hallway (R. 2523) and that the Defendant had a
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gun in his hand (R. 2526).

She stated that the Defendant and

Chapman were talking back and forth when the gun went off (R.
2531),

She, herself, was shot In the hand and the back (R. 2532,

2533) , but she was able to pull herself up (R. 2533) .
Earl Chapman and Eva Chapman, residents of the home in
which the incidents occurred, testified, as well as Officers Rudy
Van Beekum and Gail Bowcutt of the Ogden City Police Department,
who participated in the investigation of the incident.

All

testified that they saw no weapon in the basement after the
incident had occurred (R. 2258, 2278, 2293, 2322, 2323) .
Though Officer Norman Soakai testified during
Defendant's second trial, he was cross-examined only
superficially and not questioned in any manner about the issues
discussed above regarding the chain of custody of the gun
involved in the Chapman shooting

(Soakai's entire testimony, R.

2382-2393) .
James Gaskill, the ballistics expert, testified that
all the bullets found at the scene were fired from the same gun
(R. 2450).

Mr. Gaskill was not cross-examined regarding the

identity of the gun that fired the bullets, even though in the
first trial, as noted above, he testified that the gun admitted
into evidence, Exhibit 20, was the gun that fired the bullets
which were determined to have killed Chapman (R. 749).

Gaskill

was also not questioned in a way to clarify that the gun Birt
testified about was not the same gun which fired the bullets
which killed Chapman (R. 2921, 2442-2470).
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In addition to this testimony, or lack of it,
pertaining to the gun used in the Chapman shooting, there were
references made at Defendant's sentencing hearing by the State's
attorney, David Schwendiman, to supposed facts not in evidence.
Mr. Schwendiman stated the following:
"... There was preparation. A gun was purchased. A
gun was brought to the residence there, was loaded. He
waited with the gun that night." (R. 2746.)
2.

Other Facts from Second Trial

Apparently, Ms. Fletcher was well aware that the
Defendant was not happy with the defense she was presenting of
his case.

In an in-chambers conference with the judge and the

parties' attorneys, the following statements were made:
"The Court:

You want your client here for some of
this?

Ms. Fletcher:

I don°t think it is necessary. We are
going to maybe have a big explosion
today.

The Court:

Big explosion?

Ms. Fletcher:

Maybe. We have been told—

The Court:

Tell me what that is.

Mr. Parrish:

Does that mean I need to sit somewhere
else?

Ms. Fletcher:

I don't mean like necessarily violence,
but perhaps the acting out, and I get
fired and all of that stuff. We will
get to it if we have to. We are doing
the best we can on that." (R. 2564.)

HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
On J u l y 19, 1988, a h e a r i n g was h e l d on D e f e n d a n t ' s
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Motion for New Trial,

The evidence at that hearing was presented

in the form of Defendant's attorney reading pertinent portions of
prior transcripts into the record and in the admission into
evidence of documents as exhibits.

Both the defense and the

State attempted to subpoena Ginger Fletcher for this hearing, but
she was unavailable (R. 2879) . The pertinent information from
the hearing on Defendant's Motion for New Trial as it pertains to
Defendant's current appeal is summarized as follows:
1.

Evidence of Defendant's Mental Deficiencies

Statements were made to the Court that Defendant's
mental condition was a crucial issue that was not raised at
trial.

Though Defendant's sentencing hearing focused on this

issue, the Court would not consider it at that time because it
had not been raised at trial (R. 2751, 2880) .
2.

Evidence Regarding Theme of Case
(Chain of Custody of Gun)

During Defendant's second trial, as previously
discussed/ Roger Birt testified that he had purchased a revolver
for Defendant and that he and the Defendant went to test fire the
gun.

When they were firing the gunr Mr. Birt noticed that the

serial number had been filed off (R. 2484-2488/ 2883) .
Exhibit 1* was admitted/ which was a report from the
prosecutor's investigator/ Victor M. Gabrenas (R. 2883).

This

report states that shortly after Defendant's first trial, Jones
had directed his attorney/ Caine# to an area of Ogden's upper
bench where a .38 caliber revolver was found in some rocks with
the serial number filed off.

When ballistic tests were done of
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this weapon, it was determined that it was not the murder weapon
(R. 2884, Addendum, Exhibit 2 ) . Though Mr, Gabrenas testified in
Defendant's second trial (R. 2397-2402), he was not crossexamined regarding this report, nor was he asked to explain that
the gun Mr. Birt had described in his testimony which had the
serial number filed off was not the same gun used in the Chapman
shooting •
The police report written by Officer Norm Soakai
(previously discussed above), was admitted .as Exhibit 2* (R.
1886).

This report contained information from Chris Singleton

regarding the fact that the gun used in some armed robberies was
the same gun used in the Chapman shooting (R, 2888, 2889,
Addendum, Exhibit 1 ) . The contents of the report were further
discussed in this hearing.

This report states that the

registered owner of the alleged murder weapon is a Mr. Harvey
Blarney, who stated that he bought that gun from the Gift House, a
pawn shop in Ogden, and on the date of purchase he gave the gun
to Reynold Hastie.

Hastie was one of the armed robbers involved

in some robberies which took place both before and after the
Chapman shooting.

According to Chris Singleton, the gun used in

those robberies is the same gun used in the Chapman shooting (R.
2886, 2887, 2891, and Addendum, Exhibits 1, 4, 5, and 12).
Exhibits 3* and 4*, written statements given by Norwood
Fridal, were admitted (R. 2890).

Fridal states that he and

Reynold Hastie were involved in armed robberies using a .38
caliber weapon, which robberies occurred on March 4, 1983, and
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again on March 16, 1983 (Addendum, Exhibits 4 and 5) (the
shooting in this case occurred March 11, 1983) .
Exhibit 5*, a statement by Mr. Fridal that he didn't
know Defendant Robert Jones until they met in prison sometime in
September 1983, after Defendant's first trial, was admitted (R.
2896, 2897).

Fridal disavows that anyone but he and his

accomplice, Reynold Hastie, were involved in this crime spree;
i.e., the robberies described above (Addendum, Exhibit 6 ) .
The statement from the January 6, 1986, hearing, of
Officer Terry Carpenter of the South Ogden Police Department was
read (R. 2893, 2894).

Carpenter testified that Reynold Hastie

and Chris Singleton were related in some way and had spent some
time together (R. 1835) .

He further stated that Chris Singleton

also told him where the weapon was and, in fact, she admitted
that the gun may have been used in some armed robberies.

She

further stated that Mike McDiLl had the gun (R. 1836, 2893).
Exhibit 8* was admitted, which is a pawn slip, pawning
a .38 special, serial number P139058, by Michael McDill (R. 2901
and Addendum, Exhibit 7 ) . Exhibit 7* was admitted, which was an
Affidavit for Search Warrant, which was executed by Officer
Soakai to obtain the .38 caliber handgun, serial number P139058,
from the pawn shop after it had been pawned by Michael McDill (R.
2893, 2901, and Addendum, Exhibit 8 ) . Exhibit 6* was also
admitted, which was an Affidavit taken of Michael McDill in which
he admitted that he did pawn the gun after having been given it
by Chris Singleton (R. 2897, 2901 and Addendum, Exhibit 9 ) . The
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Court was reminded that Officer Soakai was not cross-examined
during the Defendant's second trial regarding the possession of
the gun nor related issues described above (R, 2386-2393, 2921).
Don Hughes' testimony at the evidentiary hearing of
January 6, 1986, was read, wherein he stated that his office
and/or the police had tried to connect the various persons
involved in the allegations contained herein.

Mr. Hughes

testified as follows:
"I know that Hastie and Fridal were co-conspirators.
Chris Singleton, I think is Hastie's cousin. They had
been involved in a lot of drug deals together. I
suspect she was also involved in one of the armed
robberies. I think one of the car descriptions would
fit her car."
(R. 1759, 1760, 2895.)
Officer Soakai's testimony at the evidentiary hearing
was read in which he stated that he had tried many, many times to
connect either Chris Singleton or Hastie or Fridal to the
Defendant, Robert Jones, but that he had been unable to make that
connection (R. 1802, 1803, 2896).
More of Officer Carpenter's prior testimony was read,
in which he stated that a woman by the name of Audrey Nordall was
somehow connected to one of the armed robbers (R. 1844, 1845,
2893, 2894) .
Evidence was proferred that Chris Norvall aka Audrey
Nordall is Defendant's ex-wife and has custody of his children.
That, in fact, Norvall and Beverly Jones had a social
relationship and, further, that Norvall would use Defendant's
children against him in ways such as allowing Beverly Jones to
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have custody of them for a day or an evening while Beverly Jones
still lived next door to the Defendant, Robert Jones (R. 2894).
During the first trial, Norvall testified that she had talked to
Beverly (R. 1481, 2895).

She did not testify at Defendant's

second trial.
3.

Evidence of Poor Cross-Examination

Gary Gibbs1 testimony from Defendant's second trial was
read.

Gibbs testified that Defendant had offered him money to

help him kill Kim Chapman (R. 2438).

This type of statement was

also contained in Soakai's poLice report (Addendum, Exhibit 1 ) .
Exhibit 10*, an Affidavit signed by Gibbs, the procurement of
which was requested by Ginger Fletcher (R. 2915) was then
admitted (R. 2913) .

Gibbs states that it is a falsehood that he

told Detective Soakai that Robert Jones had told him or asked to
help him kill Kim Chapman, referring to Soakai°s police report
(Addendum, Exhibit 10). Defendant's attorney, Ginger Fletcher,
did not cross-examine Gibbs (R. 2439-2441) nor Officer Norm
Soakai (R. 2386-2392) regarding this obvious inconsistency.
4.

Miscellaneous Issues Addressed at Defendant's Hearing
on Motion for New Trial
Statements were proffered by defense counsel, setting

forth a summary of what the Defendant's testimony would have been
on several issues as follows:
1.

That previous defense counsel, Ginger Fletcher,

failed to consult with Defendant on certain important
decisions; e.g., theory of the case.
2.

That 23 witnesses were subpoenaed, but only
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three were actually called during the trial.
3.

Mr. Jones would testify that in urging her to

defend on the theory of the case which had been agreed
to and which they had discussed/ she indicated to him
that all of that would be brought out on rebuttal (R.
2877) .
*These Exhibits/ though available to Attorney Fletcher, were not
presented during Defendant's second trial.

FACTS RELATING TO DEFENDANT'S COMPETENCY/MENTAL ILLNESS
Prior to Defendant's first trial and after an
evaluation which took place at the State Hospital/ a hearing was
held May 10/ 1983/ in which Defendant was found to be incompetent
to stand trial and was remanded to the custody of the Utah State
Hospital (R. 47-54).

On June 13/ 19R3, another hearing was held/

at which Defendant was found competent to stand trial (R. 55).
At the first trial/ members of his family testified that after
the Defendant got out of his military service, he seemed to have
changed.

He was like two different people.

His sister, Doris

Kennedy, testified that one minute he is one person and the next
he is someone else, and the someone else isn't a very nice
person.

He's ornery and irrational (R. 1035-1037).

She further

testified that when Defendant changed/ his physical
characteristics would also change/ including his voice and facial
appearance (R. 1040) .
Defendant's father, Robert Jones, Sr ., testified that
when Defendant was in the military, the chaplain called him and
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said that he felt his son was mentally ill and he should try to
get him out of the service (R. 1149).

He further testified that

when his brother, Denny, died in 1967, Defendant was devastated,
and that the Defendant had been in and out of mental institutions
eight to ten times during the last eight years (R. 1151) .
Bobbie Jones, Defendant's mother, testified that while
he was in the Army he was put in a mental hospital in Colorado
after he went AWOL (R. 1102) . She further testified that
Defendant had been in other mental hospitals, and that he had
been working with the mental health department for over eight
years (R. 1103) . She -further testified that generally he is a
sweet, beautiful person that you love to be around, but that he
seemed to turn into a second person (R. 1105 and 1106) .
The other victim in this shooting, Beverly Jones,
testified in the preliminary hearing prior to the first trial
that while in the Chapman residence, she thought the Defendant
was crazy and "looked like he was high on something.

He wasn°t

the same Robert...it was just a different, whole different
personality, like a really rotten mean person" (R. 39). She
further stated that, having known him for quite awhile, that at
times he was pretty rational and decent, and that at other times
he was not, and that on that night his eyes appeared to be glazed
over (R. 40). She testified similarly in Defendant's first trial
as well (R. 993, 994).
Nathan Joseph Webster, who was a police officer
assisting in the arrest of the Defendant, described him in the
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first trial as being incoherent and agreed that Defendant's "eyes
were glazed, appeared to be somebody that if you didn°t know
anything else about him that he would either be heavily
intoxicated or medicated or been through some harrowing
experience."

(R. 722, 723.)

In Defendant's second trial

sentencing hearing, Officer Webster testified that when he first
saw Defendant he had a glazed or dazed look (R. 2723).
Though, as indicated above, Defendant had a long
history of mental problems, the issue of mental competency was
not raised during his second trial.

However, during the

sentencing phase of the second trial, Dr. Alma Carlisle, the head
of the psychology department at the Utah State Prison, testified
regarding the mental problems suffered by Defendant.
Dr. Carlisle testified that Defendant suffered from two
distinct mental illnesses/disorders.

One is a multiple

personality disorder (R. 2688 and 2715, see also 2686).

It was

also Dr. Carlisle°s opinion that the Defendant suffers from
another mental illness called bi-polar disorder or manicdepressive (R. 2692-2693 and 2686) .
A stipulation was entered into between Defendant and
the state in which it was agreed that Dr. Van Austin, a
psychiatrist, would testify, had he been present at the hearing,
that Defendant is suffering from manic-depression and is taking
lithium for treatment of such (R. 2726).
Dr. Carlisle testified that it's possible that
suffering from manic-depression or bi-polar disorder might commit
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a crime wherein his behavior is a product of the mental illness
(R. 2716) and, further, that, in regard to the multiple
personality illness, one suffering from such is not totally in
control as one whole person is (R. 2699, 2675, 2676, 2677) .
Dr• Carlisle also testified that a normal person's
thought processes would be consistent in committing a crime from
beginning to end, and that there "seems to be more responsibility
for that [type of] individual than for a multiple, who is, to a
degree, out of control" (R. 2718).
After the evidence was presented to the Court at
Defendant's sentencing hearing September 1, 1987, before the
Honorable David E. Roth, the Court stated the following:
"This is a sentencing hearing, and I'm not here to
determine whether the Defendant had a disorder that
would, or an illness that would, excuse his conduct or
the offense. Obviously, those issues, if they were
going to be raised, would have been raised at trial.
THEY WERE NOT." [Emphasis added.]
(R. 2750-2751.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that Attorney Ginger Fletcher was
ineffective in her representation.

That her deficiencies lead to

his conviction on serious charges when there was, in fact,
evidence that, if presented, could have resulted in Defendant's
acquittal or at least a conviction on a lesser charge.

ARGUMENT
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
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States

states in part:

"In all criminal prosecutions, the

accused shall enjoy the right...to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defense."
The standard of review applied to cases where the
assistance of prior counsel is challenged has been established by
the United States Supreme Court.

The Court has stated, "To

succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires
a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the 'counsel1 guaranteed the Defendant by the
Sixth Amendment and that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense."

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668/ reh'g denied,

467 U.S. 1267 (1984), 80 L.Ed.2d 674; see also State v.
Morehouse, 748 P.2d 219 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Frame, 723
P.2d 401 (Utah, 1986).

And further, in order to show prejudice

to his case, defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.

A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the
confidence of the outcome.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 649, see also

Morehouse, 748 P.2d at 219; State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019,
1023 (Utah, 1987); State v. Wynia, 82 Utah Adv. Rep. 16.
Defendant claims the following deficiencies:
1.

Counsel Ginger Fletcher did not bring to light in

any manner Defendant's mental illness/disorders, even though
ample evidence was available regarding a long history of mental
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illness suffered by Defendant,
2.

Counsel did not pursue the obvious theme of the

case, even after having agreed to do so.
3.

Counsel failed to consult with Defendant on key

issues, and even misled Defendant, telling him that the issues he
was concerned about would be brought out in rebuttal.

They were

not.
4.

Counsel misled Defendant by having 23 witnesses

subpoenaed, but calling only three to testify.
5.

Counsel failed to adequately cross-examine certain

key witnesses.
Each area of deficiency will be addressed as a separate
subsection.
Point One:
Failure to Present Evidence of Defendant's Suffering of
Mental Illness/Deficiency
As noted above, several witnesses testified in
Defendants first trial regarding the history of his mental
condition.

They described that at one point in time Defendant

would be a nice person, but then he would switch and become an
ornery and irrational person.

His history in and out of mental

hospitals and treatment programs was also outlined fully, as set
forth above (pp. 30-31, supra).
Dr. Alma Carlisle, the head psychologist at the Utah
State Prison, testified in Defendant's sentencing hearing (second
trial) about the mental illnesses suffered by Defendant, calling
one a multiple personality disorder and the other a bi-polar
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disorder, or manic-depressive illness. Dr. Carlisle also
testified that one suffering from multiple personality disorder
is not totally in control as one whole person is, and further
that there seems to be more responsibility for an individual who
would have consistent thought processes than for a multiple who,
to a degree, is out of control (pp. 31-32, supra).
These and additional facts discussed above raise the
issue of whether or not the Defendant had the capacity to form
the intent required by statute to commit the crimes he was
charged with.

Utah Code Ann. §76-2-101, et seq.; 76-2-305. The

issue of competency to stand trial and the effect of Defendant's
mental illnesses in relation to his alleged actions should have
been addressed prior and/or during Defendant's second trial.
Utah Code Ann. §77-14-3.

The lower court refused to address this

issue at Defendant's sentencing hearing after prior counsel
withdrew (R. 2750-2751) .
Point Two:
Failure to Pursue the Obvious Theme
of the Case Even After Agreement to Do So
(Chain of Custody of the Gun)
In order for Defendant to be found guilty of Murder in
the First Degree, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that he intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another
under certain circumstances.

Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202. There

are two circumstances of 17 listed in the statute which arguably
apply as follows:
(1)(c). The actor knowingly created a great risk
of death to a person other than the victim and the
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actor.
(l)(d). The homicide was committed while the actor
was engaged in the commission or in an attempt to
commit or flight after committing or attempting to
commit...Aggravated Burglary, Burglary..., Utah Code
Ann. §76-5-202(1)(c), (d).
There is no doubt that Kim Chapman was killed by
bullets fired from a gun during a confrontation with the
Defendant.

The question is, did the Defendant commit a criminal

act, and if so, what level of crime was committed.

There are

numerous possibilities as follows:
1.

He is guilty of the charges he was convicted

2.

He is guilty only of Murder in the Second

of.

Degree if it were shown that a prerequisite for Murder
in the First Degree did not exist (Utah Code Ann. §765-203).
3.

He is guilty only of Manslaughter if it were

shown that the Defendant was suffering under an extreme
emotional disturbance (Utah Code Ann, §76-5-205).
4.

He is Not Guilty by reason that Defendant's

actions amounted to nothing more than an accident or
self defense.
5.

Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402.

He is Not Guilty due to his diminished mental

capacity.

Utah Code Ann. §76-2-305.

The alternative possibilities to Defendant's conviction
of Murder in the First Degree are viable if one of two things is
shown:
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1.

The Defendant's intent or knowledge is lacking

to the degree necessary for such conviction, and/or

it

is shown that he acted under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance, for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse.
2.

Utah Code Ann, §76-5-205; or

It is shown that the Defendant did not enter

the Chapman residence while engaged in the commission
of an Aggravated Burglary or Burglary.
Defendant was invited to the Chapman house by Beverly
Jones and told about the location of the key which he could and,
in fact, did use to let himself into the home (R. 2354, 13821384) . An obvious defense to the charge of Murder in the First
Degree is that Defendant did not commit the Burglary or
Aggravated Burglary required, but in fact had permission to enter
the home or, at most, was simply trespassing.

The elements of

the crime of Burglary include unlawful entry or remaining in a
building with intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault
therein (Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202).

Permission to enter the home

would negate the element of unlawful entry and raise a
substantial question regarding the Defendant's purpose for being
in the home.
The only other prerequisite to First Degree Murder
which could possibly apply to this case is that the Defendant
knowingly or intentionally created a great risk of death to a
person other than the victim and actor.
202(1) (d) .
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Utah Code Ann. 76-5-

The issue of what gun was involved in the shooting of
Chapman is crucial in addressing this element.

If, in fact,

Defendant took a gun into the house as the State alleges, the
argument is much stronger that Defendant did have the knowledge
and/or the intent required for the conviction.

However, if

Defendant was in the Chapman residence solely to talk to Beverly
Jones, did not carry a gun into the home and, in fact, was to a
degree himself a victim of circumstances, then the State cannot
carry its burden and the Defendant cannot be convicted of First
Degree Murder.

In support of this obvious theory of Defendant's

case is the discussion of the source of the weapon used in the
shooting.
As discussed above, the murder weapon identified by
ballistics was clearly not a gun owned at any time, nor proved to
have been possessed at any time, by the Defendant.

There were

actually four guns referred to at various times during this case.
Two of them were purchased by Defendant, one of which he had kept
and the other he had given to Beverly (pp. 13, 14 supra).

A

third gun was purchased by Roger Birt for the Defendant shortly
before the Chapman shooting (pp. 22 and 25, supra).

The evidence

has always been that none of these three guns were involved in
the Chapman shooting.

Information relating to the fourth gun has

never been presented to a jury on behalf of the Defendant.

This

fourth gun, which was the gun used in the Chapman shooting, was
purchased by Harvey Blarney from The Gift House and given to
Reynold Hastie, who, together with Norwood Fridal, used the gun
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in several armed robberies, shortly before and shortly after the
shooting in this case.

The gun was subsequently given to Chris

Singleton, who gave it to Mike McDill, who pawned it back to The
Gift House.

It was then retrieved by Officer Norm Soakai of the

Ogden City Police Department by search warrant (pp. 17-21 and 2528, supra).

It was subsequently determined by the ballistics

expert that this fourth gun was the one that fired the bullets
that killed Chapman (pp. 13 and 23, supra).
"The questions of what gun was used, how the gun got
into the Chapman basement, and who the aggressor really was
should have been presented to the jury.

Information

distinguishing the four guns was accumulated by Defendant's first
appellate attorneys, Max Wheeler and Craig Cook.

Their briefs

and other information they compiled were obviously available to
Ms. Fletcher, in that much of it was public record (Transcript of
Defendant°s evidentiary hearing held January 6, 1986 [R. 16651847]; Defendant's Appellate Brief(s) dated August 5, 1986
[Addendum, Exhibit 11]).
Defendant provides a very plausible theory that the
fourth gun was brought to the Chapman basement through Beverly
Jones.

That this gun was obtained by her from Audrey Nordall

(aka Chris Norvall), Defendant's ex-wife, with whom Beverly was
well-acquainted (p. 28, supra).

It is believed by Defendant and

his family that a link exists between Norvall and the armed
robbers, Fridal and Hastie.
Officer Carpenter (R. 1844).

This theory is also believed by
Defendant argues that Beverly Jones
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requested help from Ms• Norvall in obtaining the weapon; that
Norvall obtained the gun and loaned it to Beverly.
After the shooting incident, Defendant argues that the
gun was left on the floor; that Beverly Jones, who was still
mobile, though wounded (R. 990, 991), was able to retrieve the
weapon and hide it in a manner that it was not discovered.

At

the earliest opportunity, she enlisted the help of an accomplice,
who retrieved the weapon from the Chapman basement and returned
it to Norvall.

Norvall then returned it to her connection with

the armed robbers.

Five days after the Chapman shooting, the gun

was used in an armed robbery (p. 26, supra).
Reviewing testimony from Defendant°s second trial, the
only reference made to a gun was from the testimony of Roger
Birt.

Birt stated that he obtained a gun for the Defendant and

they had gone out shooting together, and that when they went
shooting, the serial number of the gun had been filed off.
Investigator Gabrenas1 report (Addendum, Exhibit 2) indicates
that this gun (with the serial number filed off) is clearly not
the gun used in the Chapman shooting.
Ballistics expert James Gaskill testified in
Defendant's first trial that all the bullets that had been found
had come from the same weapon, and he identified the gun which
had fired the bullets as this fourth gun, Exhibit 20 (p. 13,
supra).
In Defendant's second trial, Gaskill's testimony
included statements about the bullets.
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No mention of which gun

they were fired from was ever made.

Defense counsel Fletcher

made no effort to enlighten the jury that the weapon which Mr.
Birt had testified about was not the gun used in the shooting,
nor was the jury told that there even were other guns (see entire
cross-examination of this witness, R. 2491-2492).
Even the State admits that the issue of the chain of
custody of the gun used in the shooting is a significant issue
and would raise a doubt in the jurors1 minds.

In the State's

argument during Defendant's Motion for New Trial, State
Prosecutor Robert Parrish made the following comment:
"The State made a conscious choice not to try to
introduce either weapon because of the doubts that had
been raised at that time." (R. 2903).
It is obvious that the State felt it very beneficial to
its case to avoid discussion of the weapon in this case, and, in
fact, the State's utilization of the witness Roger Birt appears
to have been an attempt to mislead the jury to believe that the
gun discussed by Mr. Birt was the same gun used in the Chapman
shooting (R. 2481, et seq.).
Point Three:
Counsel Failed to Consult With Defendant
on Key Issues and Misled Defendant, Indicating
That the Issues He Was Concerned About Would Be
Brought Out in Rebuttal
Rule 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct regarding
communication between client and attorney states:

"(a) a lawyer

shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information; (b) a lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
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reasonably necessary to enable the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation."

Utah Code of Judicial

Administration, Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.4

(1988).

The Supreme Court has clearly set focth counsel's duty
in this respect as one of loyalty to advocate the Defendant's
cause, to consult with Defendant on important decisions, to keep
him informed as to important developments, and to use skill and
knowledge to render reliable adversarial testing.

Str ickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688; 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 694.
Defendant Jones filed a notarized Motion for Trial de
Novo, pro se, in which he sets forth Counsel Fletcher's failures
to keep him informed and to defend him as agreed.

Defendant

argues that counsel willfully and intentionally refused to
confide in, discuss, or counsel Defendant as to counsel's defense
strategy, and that he had made strong objections against the type
of defense that was presented

(R. 2148-2150).

Counsel failed to

keep Defendant informed as the law requires (R. 2164-2165, 2171,
2174, 2176).
Not only did counsel fail in her duties to consult with
Defendant and keep him informed (R. 2170), she stated, in
response to Defendant's request for a continuance, that she was
"not being paid enough by Weber County to warrant a postponement,
as it wouldn't be until September that we would be able to get
another trial date."
all summer."

Also, that she "wasn't going to work on it

(R. 2149 and 2924).

Further, Defendant felt that

counsel was more concerned about getting Defendant's trial over
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with prior to the July 3rd holiday than with Defendant's fate (R.
2151 and 2171).
Defendant claims that counsel lied to him.

She

promised him that evidence would be presented to clarify that the
gun discussed in trial was not the weapon used in the shooting.
Apparently, such promises were made only to keep the
Defendant calm, "so as not to offend the jury." (R. 2163.)
Counsel made several statements to Defendant that the evidence he
wanted to present would be brought out on rebuttal (R. 2151,
2152, 2155, 2163, 2166, 2175, and 2877).

No such evidence was

ever presented.
Counsel knew of her deficient performance, as she made
the Court aware that Defendant was unhappy and might fire her
prior to the end of the trial (R. 2564) .
Point Four:
Counsel Misled Defendant by Subpoenaeing 23 Witnesses
and Calling Only 3 to Testify
Trial counsel's failure to call witnesses to
corroborate testimony is basis for establishing inefficiency of
counsel.
Rep. 847.

People v. Schiering, 92 Cal. App. 3d 429 and 154 Cal.
See also Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14, Arrowood v.

Clusen, 723 F.2d 1364 (1984).
Defendant's statements in his written Motion for New
Trial and proffered evidence during the hearing on Motion for New
Trial were that Ms. Fletcher had agreed to and did subpoenae 23
witnesses to testify on behalf of Defendant.

Of those

subpoenaed, counsel called only three (3) to testify, sending the
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rest away without calling them (R. 2159, 2165, 2166, 2877, and
2923).

Many of those sent away were crucial to establish

Defendant's theory of the case and to impeach some of the State's
witnesses.
Point Five:
Counsel Failed to Adequately Cross-Examine
Certain Key Witnesses
Roger Birt
Counsel's inadequate questioning of this witness
(discussed supra, pp. 22, 25, 40-41).
Gary Gibbs
Mr. Gibbs testified that Defendant had offered him
$5,000.00 to help him go kill Kim Chapman.
During the hearing on Defendant's Motion for New Trial,
as indicated above, an Affidavit of Mr. Gibbs was admitted (R.
2915) which casts serious question on the credibility of the
statements he made regarding his alleged conversations with the
Defendant.

Gibbs states that the information contained in

Officer Soakai's report regarding his statement that the
Defendant asked him to help kill Chapman "is a falsehood."
Further, that Soakai had threatened Gibbs in order to get him to
make his original statement (Addendum, Exhibit 10).
Proffered testimony was admitted that Ms. Fletcher was
the one who requested the obtaining of the Affidavit from Gibbs,
and yet he was not cross-examined regarding the Affidavit (see
entire cross-examination of Gibbs, R. 2439-2441).
Beverly Jones
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In comparing the transcripts of Defendant's first
criminal proceedings in this matter with the transcripts of his
second trial, it is evident that Ms. Fletcher failed to
effectively cross-examine Beverly Jones, the State's only eye
witness to the incidents involved herein.

As noted above, in the

first trial Beverly testified regarding Defendant's apparent
mental condition, stating in the preliminary hearing of the
proceedings that he "was crazy and looked like he was high on
something.

He wasn't the same Robert...it was just a different,

whole different personality, like a really rotten, mean person"
(R. 39). She further stated that, having known him for quite
awhile, that at times he was pretty rational and decent and other
times he was not.

That on that night, his eyes appeared to be

glazed over (R. 40; see also similar testimony from Defendant's
first trial, R. 993 and 994.)
No information was elicited from Beverly regarding
these facts, which would have corroborated other evidence
regarding Defendant's suffering from a mental illness.
There was no reference made in the second trial as had
been in the first that it appeared to her that Defendant was
leaving the house when Kim Chapman grabbed Defendant's wrists,
and it was only at that time that the gun discharged (R. 983,
2150, and 2156).

It is apparent that the information that should

have been elicited would have been the basis for an argument that
the shooting was nothing more than an accident or even self
defense.
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SUMMARY
Ineffective assistance of counsel is demonstrated when
counsel's conduct results in a breakdown in the proper
functioning of the adversarial process so that the trial cannot
be relied upon to have produced a just result.

Strickland, 466

U.S. at 686 and 696; 80 L.Ed.2d at 692 and 699.

Defendant must

show (1) deficient performance that (2) prejudiced the defense
and therefore deprived the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable.

Str ickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80

L.Ed.2d at 693.
Defendant's case involves issues which have never been
fully tested in a court of law.

Though Defendant has had two

trials on serious criminal charges, his true defense has never
been presented.

During the Defendant's first trial, the defense

attorneys were not fully aware of all the facts because the
prosecutor withheld information from them (see John Caine's and
Maurice Richards' statements, pp. 18-20, supra).
Defendant's case was remanded for a new trial.

On appeal,
(See Addendum,

Exhibit 13.)
At Defendant's second trial, defense counsel Fletcher
had the benefit of records of the prior proceedings in which
much, if not all, of Defendant's obvious defense was set forth.
She further had the benefit of having spent time with Defendant
and his father in discussing the case and preparing for it.

She

was fully informed as to the nature of the defense the Defendant
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was requesting, which was obviously his best defense (R. 2149,
2151, 2158, and 2923).
Fletcher's own statements that she was not being paid
enough to do the trial, that she didn't have time to do the
trial, that she was more concerned about finishing before the
July 3 holiday, and that she expected to be fired by the
Defendant, are evidence that even she understood she was not
doing the kind of job expected of effective counsel. Further,
Defendant argues that counsel was not loyal to him nor did she
consult with nor keep him informed on important decisions, as she
is required to do.

Not calling 20 witnesses after having

subpoenaed them on important issues, poor cross-examination
techniques, and lying to the Defendant are all further evidence
of her ineffective assistance.
The most obvious failures on part of counsel were her
failure to present evidence of the Defendant's impaired/
incompetent mental condition and her failure to pursue the
obvious theme of the case in regard to the chain of custody of
the weapon involved in the shooting.
Though Defendant did get his "day in court"
procedurally speaking, Defendant did not get a trial that tested
the evidence or presented his best case, and Defendant is
entitled to that testing and presentation.

The Defendant was

deprived of a fair trial whose result is reliable.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant believes that his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is completely justified.

Based on the

foregoing issues and arguments, Defendant respectfully requests a
reversal of his conviction and a new trial ordered.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jZ>l~ day of March, 1989.
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